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the selection of the jury there had been discrimination against
laborers and women. The latter charge was summarily dismissed
because women were not required by law to serve, 9 discrimination
against them was not proved, and also defendants were not members of the excluded class.4" The Court found that the charge of
discrimination against laborers had not been proved. Although the
Court has expressly left the door open for the consideration of
charges of discrimination which fall outside the race or color category,4 1 it has indicated that it will be extremely reluctant to grant
relief in cases other than those covered by the 1875 Act of Congress.42
SANDERS

R. CAZEDESSUS

PRIVATE RIGHTS OF WAY
Private rights of way may be obtained by imposition of law'
or by voluntary contract,2 depending upon the purpose for which
the right of way is sought. The right obtained may consist of (1)
full ownership of the land underlying the right of way (2) a predial
servitude of passage (3) a right of way which does not conform to
the legal requirements of either full ownership or a predial servitude.
The owner of an estate which is completely surrounded by
other lands has the right to claim a legal servitude of passage across a
neighbor's land to the nearest public road,' for everything necessary
39. Nor are they required to serve in Louisiana, La. Const. of 1921, Art.
VI1, § 41. For a discussion of the problem as regards women jurors, see Fenberg,
Matilda, Jury Service for Women (1947) 33 Women Lawyers Journal 45.
40. Cf. State v. Dierlamm, 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938) (relief denied
to white man who objected that all negroes were excluded); and Haraway v.
State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S. W. (2d) 733 (1942) (relief denied to negro who
objected that all white persons were excluded).
41. 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1625 (U. S. 1947).
42. The purpose of the statute as a whole is stated as follows: "Whereas,
it is essential to just government we recognize the equality of all men before
the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in its dealings with the
people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of whatever nativity, race,
color, or persuasion, religious or political; and it being the appropriate object
of legislation to enact great fundamental principles into law: Therefore, Be
it enacted . . . . Section. 4 of the statute, dealing with exclusion of jurors, is
confined in terms to prohibiting disqualification 'on account or race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.'"
1. Art. 699 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Art. 709 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Art. 699, 702, La. Civil Code of 1870. La. Act 54 of 1896 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 3736]. Article 699 states that the owner of enclosed lands may claim
a right of passage to the nearest public road, railroad, tramroad, or water course.
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for the use and working of his land,4 upon proper indemnification.'
This right is granted only in instances of necessity; mere convenience
will not support the claim.' If there is disagreement regarding the
location of this legal servitude of passage, the code recognizes the
choice to be in favor of the owner of the servient estate; but the
courts have not permitted the unfair abuse of his insisting on a circuitous, impractical and expensive route instead of the shortest route,
which the code contemplates.7 This legal servitude of passage may
not be acquired by prescription because the right of passage is discontinuous;' for the same reason, it cannot be established by destination
du pare de famille.'
Other private rights of way have been established by law in
favor of private corporations engaged in business which has a public
interest, such as electric power and light companies;1" canal irrigagation and hydro-electric power companies;" pipe line companies;"
However only the right of passage to the nearest public road is under discussion
here. Following the words of the article it has been held that if the party seeking
the right of passage can go across his own land to the public road, he will be
refused the right to cross his neighbor's land. Perry v. Webb; 21 La. Ann. 247
(1869). It should also be noted that Art. 701, La. Civil Code of 1870, provides
that if the vendor of the enclosed land owns adjoining lands, the right of
passage shall be granted through the vendor's land, though a shorter way through
another neighbor's land be present.
4. Art. 702, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. Art. 699, La. Civil Code of 1870, La. Act 54 of 1896 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 3737]. The cases seem clear that the owner of the enclosed land must tender
an amount to pay for the damages he may occasion before he can obtain a
judicial decree granting him this right of passage. Ezernack v. Ezernack, 18
La. App 56, 137 So. 626 (1931).
6. Martin v. Patin, 16 La. 55 (1840); Robinson v. Herring, 20 So. (2d) 811
(La. App. 1945). Where a private road exists which is impassable during certain
seasons of the year, the court has held that a necessity exists and has granted
the right to locate a practical all weather private road. Bouis v. Watts, 25 So.
(2d) 18 (La. App. 1946); 29 SQ. (2d) 783 (La. App. 1947).
7. Littlejohn v. Cox, 15 La. Ann. 67 (1860); Bandelin v. Clark, 7 La. App.
64 (1927); Mercer v. Daws, 186 So. 877 (La. App. 1939); Wells v. Anglade, 23
So. (2d) 469 (La. App. 1945); Martini v. Cowart, 23 So. (2d) 655 (La.
App. 1945).
8. Art. 727, La. Civil Code of 1870 (discontinuous servitudes defined); Art.
766, La. Civil Code of 1870 (discontinuous servitudes may be acquired only by
title, continued use does not grant a vested right of passage); Ezernack v.
Ezernack, 18 La. App. 56, 137 So. 626 (1931) (30 year use of passage did not
give title); Broussard v. Etie, 11 La. 394 (1837); Ogborn v. Lower Terrebonne
Ref. & Mfg., Co., 129 La. 379, 56 So. 323 (1911); Comment (1938) 12 Tulane
L. Rev. 226.
9. Kelly v. Pippitone, 12 La. App. 635, 126 So. 79 (1930).
10. La. Act 156 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2880].
11. La. Act 268 of 1916 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2869].
12. La. Act 39 of 1906 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2888-2894] ; La. Act 173 of
1942 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7980-7984].
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telegraph and telephone companies;" and railroad companies. 4
Whether the expropriation comprises the property in full ownership
or whether it gives only a right of way depends upon the provisions
of the particular statute.' 5 At the same time there is the doctrine
of estoppel which operates against the landowner who has allowed
the use of passage on his land for public purposes without expropriation proceedings. 6
In the absence of a legal right to obtain a passage across the
land of another, private rights of way can be established by voluntary agreement. Such agreements are regulated by the terms of
the contract, 7 and by the appropriate law applicable to the transaction and to the right of way established thereby. Thus the legal
classification of this right of way may be of paramount importance
in the interpretation of the contract and in the determination of such
matters as the applicable prescriptive period. The legal classification
of each type of right of way is especially important in the field of
private rights of way inasmuch as their cost may be large and their
existence vital to the use of certain land or facilities, and because
there are marked differences in the law applicable to the different
types of rights of way.
In general, private rights of way may be classified into two
,categories: predial servitudes, and those which do not fulfill the
requirements of predial servitude.' 8 The situation where the full
ownership is acquired over a strip of land need not be considered
here since it presents no problem.
13. La. Act 124! of 1880 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2868].
14. La. Act 176 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2860].

15. For example, the court in Knox v. Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co., 157 La.
602, 102 So. 685 (1925), applying La. Act 208 of 1906, stated to the effect that

a railroad in an expropriation suit may expropriate only the right shown to
be needed, and would be granted a servitude unless a need for full ownership

was shown to exist.
16. ". . . when the corporation has the right of eminent domain, the land
owner waives his right to insist that the creation and exercise of the servitude

be preceded by an expropriation proceeding and estops himself from asserting
that right and restricts himself to a claim for damages or compensation when
he fails to object to the actual exercise of a servitude for a purpose of public
utility on and across his property. Gumbel v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 190
La. 904, 909, 910, 183 So. 212, 218, 214 (1938).
17. Arts. 709, 722, La. Civil Code of 1870 (as to urban rights of ingress and

egress) ; Art. 719, La. Civil Code of 1870 (as to rural servitude of passage); Art.
721, La. Civil Code of 1870.

18. That is, such stipulations
"innominate" contract.

as would

constitute a lease, or a valid
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The private servitude of passage is distinguished from other
types of rights of way by the following requirements of predial
servitudes in general.
Art. 646: "All servitudes which affect land may be divided
into two kinds, personal and real.
"Personal servitudes are those attached to the person for
whose benefit they are established, and terminate with his life.
This kind of servitude is of three sorts: Usufruct, Use and
Habitation.
"Real servitudes, which are also called predial or landed
servitudes, are those which the owner of an estate enjoys on a
neighboring estate for the benefit of his own estate.
"They are called predial or landed servitudes, because being
established for the benefit of an estate, they are rather due to
the estate than to the owner personally ..
An examination of the portion of the Civil Code governing
usufruct, use and habitation 9 shows that it has no concern with
the servitude of passage. Thus, as a servitude affecting land, the
servitude of passage must be a predial servitude under the definition of Article 646.2" Further, the many references to the servitude
of passage in Title IV of the Civil-Code "Of Predial Servitudes or
Servitudes of Land" seem to demonstrate that the redactors contemplated that the servitude of passage should be governed by that
portion of the code.21
If the servitude of private passage is to be classified as a predial
servitude, there must be two estates present, dominant and servient.' Moreover, a careful analysis of these code articles requiring
19. Arts, 533-645, La. Civil Code of 1870.
20. La. Civil Code of 1870.
21. Art. 699, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The owner whose estate is inclosed, and
who has no way to a public road, . . . may claim the right of passage on the
estate of his neighbor or neighbors to the nearest public road .......
See also
related Arts. 700 and 701, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Art. 711, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The principal kinds of urban servitudes are
the following: ....
that of passage .
Art. 719, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The right of passage in cities is a
servitude by which an owner permits his neighbor to pass through his house or
lot to arrive at his own. .. "
Art. 721, La. Civil Code- of 1870: "The principal rural servitudes are those
of passage, of way ..
22. This basic principle that two estates must be present for the existence of
a predial servitude is shown by the following articles:
Art. 648, La. Civil Code of 1870: "From the definition contained in the
preceding article, it follows that to establish a predial or real servitude there
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the existence of two estates for the existence of a predial servitude
also presents the inescapable observation that the redactors intended
a servitude to be created on an estate only in favor of an estate. If
this be a fact, a personal servitude affecting land can exist only in
the manner heretofore noted, namely, usufruct, use and habitation.
Additional evidence that the redactors of the Civil Code intended all servitudes against land (other than usufruct, use and
habitation) to require the existence of two estates, may be found in
code articles providing that servitudes may be imposed on estates
only in favor of other estates and indicating that if persons are
granted rights against estates, they are to be defined as mere per-

sonal conveniences.23
must first be two different estates, one of which owes the servitude to the other.
If then a stipulation be made of a servitude in favor of a person, and not in
favor of an estate, the obligation will not be null on that account, but it Wil not
create a real servitude." (Italics supplied.)
Art. 649, La. Civil Code of 1870: "It is necessary, in the second place, that
these two estates belong to two different persons ...
"
Art. 650, La. Civil Code of 1870: "It is necessary in the third place, that
the servitude have for its object the use or benefit of the estate in favor of which
it is established. . . ." (Italics supplied.)

Art. 649, La. Civil Code of 1870: ".... . Real servitudes, which are also called
predial or landed servitudes, are those which the owner of an estate enjoys on
a neighboring estate for the benefit of his own estate. They are called predial
or landed servitudes, because, being established for the benefit of an estate, they
are rather due to the estate than to the owner personally. . . ." (Italics supplied.)
Art. 647, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A real or predial servitude is a charge
laid on an estate for the use and utility of another estate belonging to another
owner."
Art. 651, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Predial servitudes, being due from one
estate to another, it commonly happens that these estates are in the same
neighborhood.. .. "
Art. 652, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A servitude is an incorporated
[incorporeal] right which can not exist without the estate to which it belongs,
and of which it is an accessory." (Italics supplied.)
Arts. 653, 654, 655, La. Civil Code of 1870, are related to the above articles
and also illustrate the necessity of the existence of two estates before 'a predial
servitude may be established.
23. Art. 709, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Owners have a right to establish on
their estates, or in favor of their estates, such servitudes as they deem proper;
provided, nevertheless, that the services be not imposed on the person of in favor
of the person, but only on an estate or in favor of an estate; . . ." (Italics
supplied.)
Art. 754, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Servitudes being established on estates
in favor of other estates, and not in favor of persons, if the grant of the right
declare it to be for the benefit of another estate, there can be no doubt as to
the nature of this right even though it should not be called a servitude." (Italics
supplied.)
Art. 755, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If, on the other hand, the act establishing
the servitude does not declare that the right is given for the benefit of an estate,
but to a person who is the owner of it, it must then be considered whether the
right granted be of real advantage to the estate, or merely of personal convenience to the owner." (Italics supplied.)
Art. 757, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If, .
the concession from its nature
is a matter of mere personal convenience, it is considered personal, and can not
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If this analysis of the articles of the Civil Code concerning personal and predial servitudes is correct, a general definition of a servitude of passage should specify a relationship between two estates,
not necessarily contiguous,2 4 whereby one estate owes a right of
passage to the other for the benefit of the dominant estate.
However, these legal requisites of a servitude of passage do not
appear in the case of Mallet v. Thibault25 wherein the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that a right of passage could be a personal
servitude due from an estate to a person. In the Mallet case, plaintiff, owner of a lot adjoining that of defendant, sought to enforce
a stipulation pour autrui in defendant's deed for a right of passage
over defendant's lot.. The court cited Frost Johnson Lumber' Company v. Salling's Heirs" as authority in ruling that a servitude could
be created upon lands in favor of a person. The Frost Johnson case
applied the rules of predial servitudes to an agreement by a landowner granting to another person the right to extract oil and gas
from his land. Later cases have consistently followed the practice
of applying the law of servitudes to mineral rights. But the Frost
Johnson case represents at best a tenuous extension of the law of
servitudes, for want of any better device in the available legal
materials. 7
To use the Frost Johnson extension of the law of servitudes as
the basis for decision in a field unrelated to mineral rights creates
the dangerous possibility of still further misapplication of the law
of servitudes. A re-examination of the code articles governing servitudes leads to the conclusion that, with the exception of the personal
servitudes of usufruct, use and habitation, the redactors of the Civil
Code intended all servitudes affecting land to be predial servitudes,
wherein two estates exist, one owing a service to the other, for the
benefit of the dominant estate. There seems to be little justification
for the court to graft the noted extensions in the field of mineral
be made real but by express declaration of the parties, Thus for example, if the
owner of a house near a garden or park, should stipulate for the right of walking
and gathering fruits and flowers therein, this right would be considered personal
to the iudividual, and not a servitude in favor of the house or its owner.
(Italics supplied.)
24. Art. 651, La. Civil Code of 1870 (quoted in footnote 22).
25. 212 La. 79, 31 So. (2d) 601 (1947), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-Property (1948) 8 LoMsIA-A
Law REViEw 234; noted in (1948) 8 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 427.
26. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
27. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 TermProperty (1948) 8 LoUISIANA LAW IlvrEw 234.
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rights onto these ancient laws governing servitudes of private passage.
This examination of the basic elements of the predial servitude
of private passage was made for the purpose of identifying this
servitude in such a manner as to make possible a distinction between
a servitude of passage and a right of way which is not a servitude.
If an agreement granting a right of way across land does not possess the elements necessary for the creating of a servitude on the
land or constitute a sale of full ownership of the land, it is obvious
that another type of right was created.
Consider, for exam-iple, the case of a corporation which makes
agreements with landowners across the State of Louisiana stipulating that the corporation shall have a right of way for a pipeline
across the landowner's property, without any intent to purchase the
land in full ownership. Assume further that this corporation possesses no real property in Louisiana with which any reasonable sort
of predial service relationship could be established. Such conditions
would apparently preclude the right of way from being classified
as a servitude, since a predial servitude of passage cannot exist without a relationship of service existing between two estates. Further,
it would seem to make no difference in this case if the pipeline
company had been a public carrier and possessed the right of
eminent domain, inasmuch as the statutes granting pipe line companies the right of expropriation are similar to the expropriation
statutes covering most public utilities and do not specifically classify
the legal nature of the right of way thus obtained. Where the
public utility has not shown a need for full ownership of the land,
the nature of the right of way thus obtained under the expropriation proceedings should be governed .by the same rules which determine the legal classification of other rights of way. It is important to note, however, that no cases or statutes could be found wherein cognizance was taken of the fact that this type of right of way'
is neither a servitude nor a conveyance in full ownership. However,
there is little doubt that a contract creating such a right of way
would be valid.28
In order to protect the rights of parties to a contract creating,
such a right of way, a determination should be made by the legislature or the courts of the specific legal classification of the right of
28. Art. 1764, La. Civil Code of 1870: "All things that are not forbidden by
law, may legally become the subject of, or the motive for contracts;.
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way. This is especially important in view of the fact that contracts
now exist wherein the parties probably thought they were establishing servitudes of right of way when merely creating other rights
which do not come under that classification.
To state here that a contract creating such a right of way should
be governed by the title of the Civil Code concerning conventional
obligations " or that it should be governed by one of the titles on
particular types of contract such as lease"0 or sale"' would be pure
speculation. However, it should be noted that when the court or
the legislature does make a specific legal classification of this private
right of way, important policy considerations will be involved, not
the least of which will be the question as to what prescriptive period
will best serve the state's economic and general needs.
JOHN C. CAMP

ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVITUDES BY DESTINATION
Art. 767. The destination made by the owner is equivalent
to title with respect to continuous apparent servitudes.
By destination is meant the relation established between
two immovables by the owner of both, which would constitute
a servitude
if the two immovables belonged to different
1
owners.
Art. 768. Such intention is never presumed till it has been
proved that both estates, now divided, have belonged to the
same owner, and that it was by him that the things have been
placed in the situation from which the servitudes result.2
Art. 769. If the owner of two estates, between which there
exists an apparent sign of servitude, sell one of those, and if the
deed of sale be silent respecting the servitude, the same shall
continue to exist actively or passively in favor of or upon the
estate which has been sold.'
For the establishment of servitudes, Article 767 provides that the
destination made by the owner is equivalent to a title when a con29. Arts. 1761-2291, La. Civil Code of 1870.
30. Arts. 2668-2777, La. Civil Code of 1870.
31. Arts. 2438-2659, La. Civil Code of 1870.
1. La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

